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APPROACHING “DANGEROUS” TERRITORY: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECTV V.
IMBURGIA AND THE CURRENT SCOPE OF U.S. ARBITRATION LAW
By
Stephanie Lapple*
I.  

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Law of Arbitration and the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”)1 remain worthy focuses of review before the Supreme Court in recent terms.2
As exemplified in October 2015, the Court continues to grant certiorari to a variety of
arbitration issues so that the substantive body of arbitration law can be more carefully
developed and clearly defined.3
In general, domestic arbitration law has widely developed since the inception of
the FAA in 1925, primarily as a response to judicial hostility and resentment of
arbitration agreements. The history of arbitration precedent reflects that, for the most
part, the Court has constructed not only a reliable alternative to dispute resolution, but an
increasingly resilient and substantive body of arbitration law that emphatically enforces
agreements to arbitrate, except where agreements are deemed unlawful on the
increasingly narrower grounds under the savings clause of FAA Section 2.4
This article analyzes the most recent decision by the Supreme Court reviewing
arbitration, DIRECTV v. Imburgia,5 which is consistent with our current arbitration
regime; the decision highlights the emphatic federal policy of enforcing agreements to
arbitrate. The nature of the decision, in that it consistently reflects this everstrengthening pro-arbitration policy, serves as an appropriate platform to review the
current body of arbitration law and resulting implications to come. First, this article
considers the history of the federalization of arbitration law with an additional emphasis
on California decisions. Then, this article provides an overview of Imburgia and implies
that its disposition was foreseeable in light of the Court’s historically adamant
federalization of the FAA.
While Imburgia could be easily categorized as another anti-arbitration California
decision that was predictably overturned, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is noteworthy
*
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1

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).

2

See DIRECTV, Inc., v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen
v. AnimalFeeds, Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010); 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 566 U.S. 247 (2009).
3

See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).

4

See 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
5

Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
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because she asserts that federalizing the law of arbitration has finally gone too far.6
Justice Ginsburg defines the Imburgia decision as “dangerous,” and contends that, right
now, federalizing arbitration law may be more important to the Court than assuring state
courts are left without interference to interpret their own contracts based on the laws of
the state.7 In more dramatic terms, Justice Ginsburg accuses the Supreme Court of
prioritizing what appears as its obsession over arbitration law to the point of dismantling
the autonomy of the states and stripping them of a principle upon which our country was
founded.8
Taking Justice Ginsburg’s dissent into mind, this article reflects on the rather
negative implications stemming from the Court’s creation of the substantive body of
arbitration law and how its current scope should be defined. Broader yet pertinent areas
to this discussion include a review of the original intent and purpose underlying the FAA
in light of its expanded jurisprudence, the impact of the Roberts Court, and the specific
effects of adhesive agreements on weaker parties, such as through “claim suppressing”
and “boot strapping” arbitration. In addition, this article offers modern critiques of
Concepcion9 to further present the increasingly dangerous scope of arbitration.
Ultimately, the discussion of these various components, which have contributed in
unique ways to the development of arbitration law, largely highlights that there is no
exact reason why arbitration law has resorted to an utmost liberal policy. Perhaps these
components suggest that it may be time for Congress to intervene in what might now be
an overly federalized policy. Until that time comes, Imburgia will represent the current
scope of arbitration law, which is defined by its emphatic federal policy favoring
arbitration.10 Regardless of whether one considers its implications to be dangerous or
not, arbitration’s far-reaching impact will continue to render its scope a noteworthy
component of United States’ jurisprudence.
II.  

THE FEDERALIZATION OF U.S. ARBITRATION LAW

A.  The Origins of U.S. Arbitration Law and the Enactment of the FAA
U.S. arbitration law has undergone rapid federalization since the inception of the
FAA. The first uses of arbitration in the U.S., however, were laughable. Despite the
current increasing trend in the magnitude and frequency of arbitration in the United

6

See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 473, 476-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

7

See id. at 473, 477-78.

8

See id. at 477-78.

9

Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).

10

See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
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States, arbitration law prior to 1925 was largely met with judicial hostility.11 Before
Congress enacted the FAA, courts reluctantly enforced arbitration agreements and
perceived them “as a way to force potential litigants to surrender their rights to a jury and
public forum for the resolution of their legal disputes.”12 Judges emphasized their duty to
protect weaker parties from forced arbitration proceedings and further justified their
reluctance through common law techniques.13 For example, the “ouster doctrine,”14
rooted in common law, was a platform upon which judges would refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements because the agreement tended to “oust” the courts of the judges’
jurisdiction.15 In contrast to the modern emphatic policy favoring arbitration, judges
created “loopholes” by allowing losing parties to pursue remedies in court and revoke the
arbitration agreement before any final award was entered.16 This led to the firmly rooted
common law practice of not enforcing arbitration agreements and defined arbitration law
as far from credible.17
In time, businesses began to shape their need for a more serious platform
underlying the enforcement of arbitration agreements and consequently pressured
legislatures to overrule this common law practice.18 As a response to judicial hostility,19
Congress mirrored the New York Arbitration Act of 1920, which was a statutory scheme
for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements, to create the Federal
Arbitration Act in 1925.20 The FAA bolstered the enforcement of arbitration agreements

11

Lyra Haas, Note, The Endless Battleground: California’s Continued Opposition to the Supreme Court’s
Federal Arbitration Act Jurisprudence, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2014) (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at
337); see also Salvatore U. Bonaccorso, Note, State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration Law, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2015); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to
Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 63-64 (2005).
12

Bonaccorso, supra note 11, at 1149.

13

Haas, supra note 11, at 1422.

14

Id. (citing Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What If the Bellwether Cases Were
Decided by a Truly Conservative Court?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 883, 886 (2012)).
15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

McGuiness & Karr, supra note 11, at 63 (explaining the function of arbitration within the business
community); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 460 (1996).
19

Haas, supra note 11, at 1423 (citing Stephen E. Friedman, Protecting Consumers from Arbitration
Provisions in Cyberspace, the Federal Arbitration Act and E-Sign Notwithstanding, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
377, 381 (2008)); see also Bonaccorso, supra note 11, at 1149 (“Congress sought to eliminate this hostility
through the FAA and make courts neutral to arbitration provisions . . . .”).
20

See Haas, supra note 11, at 1423 (citing the law of New York in 1920 to show its similarity to FAA
Section 2); see also Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804.
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through incorporating Section 2, which provides that “any contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such a contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”21
Although the immediate impact of the FAA was minimal and functioned for procedural
purposes in federal courts,22 the Supreme Court has since built a well-founded decisional
law promoting the enforcement of arbitration agreements under Section 2 of the FAA.23
B.  The Federalization of the FAA
Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin Manufacturing Co. traces the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the underlying legislative purpose of the FAA.24 In Prima Paint, the
Court addressed the jurisdictional issue, stemming originally from a question of contract
validity, of whether courts or arbitrators had the authority to decide the impact of a
fraudulent inducement claim on the parties’ pre-existing agreement to arbitrate.25
Broadly underscoring Congress’ primary objectives underlying the FAA, the Court
illustrated that Prima Paint was not a question of “whether Congress may fashion federal
substantive rules to govern questions arising simply in diversity cases, . . . [but] whether
Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to
subject matter over which Congress plainly has the power to legislate.”26 Prima Paint
provided an important framework for arbitration law by projecting that Congress “could
create federal law where it had legislative authority to act,” and, through the FAA,
“provide[d] [a] substantive directive[] to the federal courts.”27 In this particular diversity

21

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

22

Bonaccorso, supra note 11, at 1151; see also Haas, supra note 11, at 1423 (citing IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION – NATIONALIZATION – INTERNATIONALIZATION 42-47
(1992)).
23

See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v.
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Rent-A-Center West,
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010); 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Volt Info. Scis v. Bd. of Trs.,
489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984);
Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
24

Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 395; THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
ARBITRATION 260 (5th ed. 2014).
25

Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402-05.

26

Id. at 405.

27

Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 405.
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action, the federal court was required to apply the FAA in line with Congress’ intent,
which the Court concluded was to “foster the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”28
The Court’s emphasis on Congress’ broad intent, however foundational for the
substantive body of arbitration law, was restricted to cases involving interstate commerce
arising in federal court.29 Prima Paints’ full implications and evolvement over time are
reflected through a series of cases in the 1980s known as the federalism trilogy.30 Moses
H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp.31 involved a contract dispute between a hospital
and building contractor, where the Court considered the district court’s decision to stay a
federal case pending the resolution of a parallel state action based on the Colorado River
abstention doctrine.32 Importantly, the Court indirectly addressed the scope of the FAA
insofar as a state court’s role in enforcing arbitration agreements.33 In holding that
Section 2’s mandate was applicable to enforcing the agreement, the Court emphasized
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration . . . .”34 The Court also explained that the FAA provides basic rights to
arbitration and suggested that all courts have a duty to enforce promises to arbitrate.35
Subsequently, the Court more affirmatively defined the scope of the FAA,
clarifying that this duty extends equally to state courts in Southland Corp. v. Keating.36
The Court in Southland Corp. granted certiorari to address whether the California
Supreme Court correctly held that allegations of statutory directive claims under the
California Franchise Investment Law could not be adjudicated in arbitration.37 Focusing
on Section 2, the Court expressly held that the FAA had a preemptive effect on state
courts and state substantive law.38 In other words, both state and federal courts
maintained a duty to apply the federal policy underlying arbitration law and the FAA.39
The Court articulated a preference for enforcing arbitration agreements by emphasizing
Congress’ intent to create a “national policy favoring arbitration” that left states

28

Id. See also Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1; Moses H. Cone., 460 U.S. at 1.

29

Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 405.

30

CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 268; see Byrd, 470 U.S. 213; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1; Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. 1.
31

Moses H. Cone., 460 U.S. 1.

32

Id. at 13 (analyzing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)).

33

See id. at 13-14.

34

Id. at 7.

35

Id. at 25-26; CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 270.

36

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).

37

Id. at 4.

38

Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14-16.

39

CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 278.
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powerless to require the judicial forum for arbitral disputes.40 The Court, noting that the
California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute clashed with the FAA,41
consequently promoted a national federal policy to thwart continued attitudes of
hostility.42 Absent this national federal policy, the Court reasoned that hostility could be
manifested through state law and forum shopping if the FAA only governed federal
courts.43
The final case of the federalism trilogy, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,44
involved an arbitration agreement between a securities brokerage firm and customer who
filed a complaint in district court alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) and other state law claims related to securities regulation.45
Denying the lower courts application of the “intertwining doctrine,” which barred the
arbitration of state law claims that were factually inseparable from the various other
federal securities claims, the Supreme Court held that the state law claims were, in fact,
arbitrable.46 The Court, once again relying on Congress’s intent, articulated that judicial
enforcement was to be ensured over the “suggestion that the . . . goal . . . was to provoke
the expeditious resolution of claims” by resorting to the judicial forum.47 It follows that
the federalism trilogy undoubtedly outlined the emphatic federal policy of the FAA and
“effectively federalized the U.S. law of domestic arbitration.”48
The FAA has since maintained an expansive authority over matters arising out of
international disputes and statutory law. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., the Court determined claims arising under the Sherman Act between an
American auto dealer and foreign auto manufacturer were arbitrable,49 and thereby
integrated an international case into U.S. domestic arbitration law. Importantly, the Court
expressed that the parties did not forgo their substantive rights afforded by the statute
under which the claims were brought while bound by the agreement to arbitrate.50
Acknowledging the lack of any exception in either the FAA or the Sherman Act, the

40

Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10.

41

Id. at 16.

42

See id. at 15.

43

Id. at 15-16.

44

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).

45

Id. at 214-15.

46

Id. at 216-17; see generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 280.

47

Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219.

48

CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 281.

49

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).

50

Id. at 628.
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Court did not warrant any additional exception despite the establishment of antitrust laws
and importance of the private damages remedy in the Sherman Act.51
The reasoning of Mitsubishi was further reflected in Shearson/American Express
v. McMahon, which examined the arbitrability of claims under the Exchange Act and
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.52 In its decision, the Court
attempted to clarify when federal statutory claim acts may be inarbitrable.53 In doing so,
the Court placed the burden on the party opposing arbitration to prove that Congress did
intend to limit particular claims to the judicial forum.54 Since this holding, no federal
statute to date has met this test to establish that a congressional intent exists to direct
parties to a judicial forum over arbitration.55 Also, it is important to note that the
McMahon Court acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling its decision with Wilko v.
Swan, which previously held the Securities Act of 1933 was non-arbitrable and generally
reflected the common law attitude of judicial hostility.56 The Court subsequently
overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express57 and signified the
supremacy of modern arbitration law when it held that Securities Act claims are
arbitrable.58 Together, these landmark cases reflect the expansive shift toward a more
authoritative FAA. The decisions likewise demonstrate how the Court has rarely
tolerated any grounds for deferring claims, subject originally to arbitration, to judicial
forums.
A history of the federalization of the FAA would be unfounded without
recognizing Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University, which has been deemed a setback in modern arbitration jurisprudence.59 In
Volt, the contract at issue called for both arbitration and the application of local law in
provisions describing dispute resolution and choice-of-law.60 The California courts
denied Volt’s motion to compel arbitration and ordered a stay of the arbitral proceeding
following California state law.61 Under California law, courts had the discretion to stay
arbitration pending the outcome of litigation arising out of the same transaction or series

51

Id. at 634-635.

52

Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).

53

Id. at 242.

54

Id. at 227.

55

Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and
Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN. L. REV. 795, 843 (2012).
56

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32 (analyzing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).

57

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).

58

Id. at 484-85.

59

Volt Info. Scis v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. at 468.

60

Id. at 470.

61

Id. at 471-73.
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of transactions involving parties not bound by the arbitration agreement.62 Volt shook the
strong foundation of arbitration policy by upholding the parties’ clear contractual intent
to have state law undermine the agreement to arbitrate.63 In other words, the Court
emphasized principles of contractual freedom when it upheld that the Volt parties chose
to be bound by the procedural laws of California in the choice-of-law provision.64
Although the Volt contract was silent as to whether the parties made an express choice of
law governing arbitration,65 the majority’s decision laid out a dangerous groundwork in
its new doctrinal development by creating a basis for courts to employ anti-arbitration
interpretations in the future based on freedom of contract.
Nevertheless, the federalization of arbitration law has been strongly reaffirmed
since Volt.66 In a 1995 case, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, the Court
stood firmly behind federalization by thwarting judicial hostility.67 The dispute involved
an arbitration clause between an Alabama homeowner and a Terminix franchisee.68 In
sum, an Alabama homeowner, who originally kept the agreement in dispute, sold his
home to another resident and transferred the agreement with the sale.69 The new
homeowner eventually filed suit against Terminix.70 The Supreme Court of Alabama
upheld the lower court’s refusal to stay the court action pending arbitration through its
reasoning that any interstate commerce grounds for the original transaction became too
tenuous over time.71 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and held
unequivocally that the FAA preempts state law when there is diversity jurisdiction, in
addition to whenever a basis for federal law exists in state courts, and even when state
law would govern the merits of the case.72 The same principles in Dobson were later
affirmed by Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna.73
62

Id. at 471 n.3.

63

Id. at 479.

64

Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.

65

Id. at 476-77.

66

See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 288-93.

67

See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).

68

Id. at 268.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268.

72

Id. at 270-77.

73

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681 (1996); see generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 289 (explaining that Doctor’s Associates “added
nothing new to the Court’s doctrine on arbitration, but confirmed the strength of the federalization
development”).
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The Court has most famously and forcefully curbed resistance to arbitration law
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, when it declared that the FAA preempted
California’s Discover Bank rule using the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate
arbitration agreements that contained class action waivers.74 Likewise, in three recent per
curiam opinions, the Court “affirmed the now self-evident proposition” that the federal
law triumphed over state law in the specific situations when two of four claims in a
dispute regarding accounting practices were not subjected to arbitration,75 when public
policy rendered an exception to the arbitrability of personal injury and death claims,76 and
non-compete clauses could not be enforced under Oklahoma state law.77 Today, there is
little doubt that the Court intended to build a strong substantive body of arbitration law
after dispensing with many boundaries which would have prevented the federalization of
the FAA as illustrated in these summarized cases.
III.  

CALIFORNIA’S RESISTANCE TO ARBITRATION

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has blatantly reaffirmed its well-founded
decisional law of arbitration, California courts have persistently rendered anti-arbitration
decisions at odds with the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.78 This summary
of arbitration decisions arising out of California sheds light on the disposition set forth in
the Imburgia case before it reached the Supreme Court.
Numerous California decisions have ambiguously portrayed the FAA to create
exceptions and render arbitration agreements unenforceable.79 For example, in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
of the phrase “involving commerce” under Section 1 and conclusion that the FAA did not
extend to arbitration agreements in employment contracts.80 The Court relied on its
liberal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements and the ejusdem generis statutory
maxim to embrace a narrow exemption to transportation workers in employment

74

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (invalidating Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)); see generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 291.
75

See KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 566 U.S. 18 (2011) (per curium).

76

See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curium).

77

See Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2013) (per curium).

78

See, e.g., Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996 (9th
Cir. 2010); Shoyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007); Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Lopez v. Kmart Corp., No. 15-cv-01089-JSC, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 58328, at *1-20 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2015); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal.
2014); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
79

Haas, supra note 11, at 1428-29.

80

Adams, 532 U.S. at 119.
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arbitration agreements.81 Similarly, the Court overturned a Ninth Circuit decision relying
erroneously on the doctrine of manifest disregard to challenge arbitration agreements
under Section 10 of the FAA in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., v. Mattel, Inc.82
California courts often address preemption when interpreting arbitration
agreements, as evidenced in Imburgia.83 Specifically, the courts have deferred to state
law interpretations of unconscionability under the savings clause of Section 2 to avoid
enforcing agreements.84 Through this process of “covert construction,” California courts
have readily concluded that state law preempts federal law governing arbitration
agreements.85
The United States Supreme Court in Perry v. Thomas cautioned that state laws
might be relied upon only if “they arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”86 In addition, the Court
expressed with regard to the savings clause in Doctor’s Associates that only “generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied
to invalidate arbitration agreements . . . .”87 This precedent did not provide the ground
for California courts to rely on state law to interpret arbitration agreements disfavoring
the policy underlying the FAA.
Nonetheless, California courts have relied on a broad interpretation of this
precedent to render arbitration agreements unenforceable. For example, in Armendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, the California Supreme Court focused on
unconscionability and expressed the concept of “mutuality” to hold that arbitration
agreements must meet minimum requirements underlying due process to be
enforceable.88 Three years later, the Ninth Circuit applied California law in Ingle v.
Circuit City Stores to hold that there was a rebuttable presumption of substantive
unconscionability in any contract to arbitrate between an employer and employee.89 In
81

Id.

82

See generally Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 567.

83

See, e.g., Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 473-475.

84

See Haas, supra note 11, at 1432-33.

85

See generally Daniel B. Mitchell, Note, Unconscionable Construction: How the Ninth Circuit Evades the
FAA by Severing Arbitration Agreements as Unconscionable, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 303 (2012) (describing
how the Ninth Circuit in Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996 (9th Cir.
2010), used the process of covert construction to affirm the application of California state law to an
arbitration agreement).
86

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).

87

Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).

88

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (the minimum
requirements for an valid arbitration agreement included (1) no limitation of available remedies; (2)
adequate discovery; (3) a written arbitration decision setting forth, however briefly, the essential findings
and conclusions on which the decision is based; and (4) all the expenses unique to arbitration are to be
borne by the employer).
89

Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Ingle, the Ninth Circuit created its own rule of unconscionability by requiring mutuality
of obligation in arbitration agreements.90 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the mere fact
that an arbitration agreement existed between an employer and employee could render the
contract one-sided enough to shock the conscious of the court.91 In creating this
rebuttable presumption, the Ninth Circuit placed the burden of proof on the party seeking
enforcement to show that the contract was not unconscionable.92 Ingle is problematic for
arbitration law because it converted policy concerns for employees into an outlet to a
judicial forum, and this ultimately reflected judicial hostility to enforcing arbitration
agreements.93 Under the current law, the FAA strictly preempts this “brand” of
unconscionability and was designed to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration.94
Similarly in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
relied on unconscionability to create a specific test for determining the enforceability of
class arbitration waivers.95 The California Supreme Court considered Southland Corp.
and reasoned that the United States Supreme Court “did not answer directly the question
whether a class action waiver may be unenforceable as contrary to public policy or
unconscionable.”96 Thus, the California Supreme Court developed a specific test
declaring class action waivers were unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable in
situations involving (1) consumer contracts of adhesion, (2) where the disputes
predictably involved small damage claims, and (3) where it was alleged that the party
with greater “bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”97
Discover Bank was applied in Shoyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. in
which the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the savings clause under Section 2 authorized states
to apply general contract defenses against arbitration agreements and held that the
Discover Bank test applied to all class action waivers regardless of whether the
agreement contained an arbitration provision.98 Likewise, Discover Bank was relied
upon to invalidate a franchise-franchisee arbitration clause at issue in Bridge Fund
Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., which held generally that state policies
concerning fair business practices and unconscionability provided California a
“materially greater issue” in deciding the case.99
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A final example along this line of preemption cases is Preston v. Ferrer.100 In
Preston, a California attorney tried to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract involving
a law that vested original jurisdiction for cases arising under the California Talent
Agencies Act (CTAA) in the Labor Commissioner.101 The California Court of Appeal
held that the Labor Commissioner had exclusive original jurisdiction and that the FAA
did not preempt California state law because it did not discriminate against arbitration
clauses, but rather relocated original jurisdiction for all disputes arising under the
CTAA.102 The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that the FAA preempted
the California law. This included any state laws seeking to establish primary jurisdiction
in a forum that would limit the applicability and enforcement of arbitration
agreements.103
Concepcion is worth highlighting again for its direct impact on the Discover Bank
rule arising out of California and for its force in overturning many California
“preemption decisions.”104 After the California Supreme Court ruled that the class action
waiver in AT&T’s contract was unconscionable under the Discover Bank test, the
Supreme Court decided that California’s law acted as an “obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”105 According to the
Court, this interpretation was necessary to preserve the power of the FAA.106 The Court
also clarified that the savings clause of Section 2 “should not be construed to include a
State’s preference for procedures that are incompatible with arbitration.”107 In theory,
Concepcion limited California courts’ efforts to preserve access to the judicial forum
through whatever “devices and formulas” the courts would express as contradictory to the
FAA. 108
In recent times, California has made veiled efforts to evade the emphatic federal
policy favoring arbitration set forth in Concepcion,109 and this response suggests that a
lingering bias toward arbitration remains in place.110 For example, in Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, which was pending while Concepcion was decided,

100

Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).

101

Id. at 350.

102

Ferrer v. Preston, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 631, 634 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).

103

Preston, 552 U.S. at 359.

104

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (invalidating Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
105

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.

106

Id. at 341-44.

107

Id. at 343.

108

Id.

109

See generally Bonaccorso, supra note 11, at 1159.

110

See Haas, supra note 11, at 1439.

164

the California Supreme Court found yet another loophole.111 The California court held
that the employee’s arbitration agreement did not require the employee, as a condition of
employment, to give up the right to bring a PAGA action under the Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 in any form, which otherwise would be contrary to state policy and
thereby unenforceable.112 Finally, Lopez v. Kmart Corp. is another modern decision in
which California avoided arbitration.113 In Lopez, the Northern District of California did
not enforce an arbitration agreement on the grounds of disaffirmance, despite recognizing
the agreement as valid.114
In conclusion, California courts have persistently refused to endorse the emphatic
federal policy of arbitration law, even in recent times. The Supreme Court’s most current
arbitration precedent is reflective of this clash once again. The following section will
discuss how the California Court of Appeal drew attention for its anti-arbitration
disposition in Imburgia, which centers on what has been an important factor the Court
has utilized throughout the federalization of the FAA: the FAA’s preemption effect on
state law.
IV.  

DIRECTV V. IMBURGIA

A.  California Court of Appeal
DIRECTV customer, Amy Imburgia, filed a complaint against DIRECTV
alleging unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, false advertising, violations of the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), unfair competition law (UCL), and California
Civil Code Section 1671.115 These claims asserted that the television service had
improperly charged its customers early termination fees.116 Because Kathy Greiner filed
a similar claim a day later, both plaintiffs jointly filed.117 Subsequently, the lawsuit
111
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proceeded at the same time as a multidistrict litigation proceeding containing similar
claims in federal court.118 DIRECTV moved to stay the action pending the outcome of
the multidistrict litigation, but the Superior Court denied DIRECTV’s motion and granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification for some claims but not others.119 The
decision was rendered on April 20, 2011.120
The Supreme Court decided Concepcion on April 27, 2011, overruling Discover
Bank and holding that, for the most part, class action waivers in consumer contracts are
unconscionable and unenforceable.121 Consequently, DIRECTV moved to stay or
dismiss the action, decertify the plaintiffs’ class, and compel arbitration.122 The Superior
Court denied the motion and DIRECTV appealed.123
1.   Relevant Provisions
DIRECTV’s customer agreement for the acceptance of its programming
equipment contained an arbitration provision (Section 9) which specified that “any legal
or equitable claim relating to this Agreement, any addendum, or your Service” will first
be addressed through an informal process,124 and then:
[I]f we cannot resolve a Claim informally, any Claim either of us
asserts will be resolved only by binding arbitration. The arbitration
will be concluded under the rules of JAMS that are in effect at the
time the arbitration is initiated . . . and under the Rules set forth in
this Agreement.125
There was a “Special Rules” heading governing Section 9:
Neither you nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims in
arbitration by or against other individuals or entities, or arbitrate
any claims as a representative member of a class or in a private
attorney general capacity. Accordingly, you and we agree that the
JAMS Class Action Procedures do not apply to our arbitration. If,
however, the law of your state would find this agreement to
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dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this
entire Section 9 is unenforceable.126
Section 10 of the agreement contained a choice-of-law provision, “Applicable Law:”
The interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement shall be
governed by the rules and regulations of the Federal
Communications Commission, other applicable federal law, and
the laws of the state and local area where the Service is provided to
you. This agreement is subject to modification if required by such
laws. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9 shall be governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act.127

2.   Discussion and Holding
The California Court of Appeal reviewed the Superior Court’s decision to deny
DIRECTV’s motion to compel arbitration de novo and applied California contract law to
determine whether the arbitration agreement was legally enforceable.128 The court
affirmed the Superior Court’s denial as to the motion to compel arbitration.129
In affirming the Superior Court’s decision, the California Court of Appeal focused
on the interpretation of the phrase, “the law of your state” to determine the enforceability
of the agreement.130 The court agreed with plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable because the agreement was subject to the CLRA—or the
“law of [their] state”—which, at the time the agreement was created, followed Discover
Bank and California state law that addressed the right to bring a class action.131
In support of this conclusion, the appellate court initially emphasized the broad
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms as set forth by Volt.132
Applying freedom of contract principles, the court distinguished between the ability of
the parties to “opt out” of the FAA default rules under Ario v. Underwriting Members of
Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, an option which placed the choice-of-law provision in the
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arbitration agreement on equal footing with any other contracts insofar as its
enforceability.133 In addition, the court cited the Discover Bank appellate court decision
as an example of how California had previously held that parties may choose what law
governs the enforceability of a class action waiver.134
When interpreting the phrase, “if . . . the law of your state would find this
agreement to dispense with class action arbitration procedures unenforceable,” the court
contemplated if it was initially included in the agreement by the parties to mean, “the law
of your state without considering the preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA” or “the law of
your state to the extent that it is not preempted by the FAA,” and chose the former.135 In
sum, the court affirmed that that the reference to “the law of your state” provision
provided an exception to the arbitration agreement’s general adoption of the FAA in
Section 10.136
Further, the court rejected DIRECTV’s argument that there was no inconsistency
among the provisions that sought to apply both state and federal law, meaning the FAA
broadly governed the agreement through its preemptive effect.137 The court reasoned that
applying state law versus federal law in this case would lead to substantially different
outcomes of enforcement versus non-enforcement of the class action waiver.138 Also, the
court applied common law principles to determine that ambiguous contract language
should be construed against the drafter.139 Thus, DIRECTV, as the drafter, could not
“claim the benefit of the doubt.”140 Subtly, the court addressed the overruling of
Discover Bank by Concepcion and iterated that the plaintiffs who filed their lawsuit in
2007 were unlikely to anticipate that the Supreme Court would preempt Discover Bank,
and, therefore, should be protected as the party who did not draft the agreement.141
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Importantly, the California Court of Appeal noted that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
in Murphy v. DIRECTV, Inc. was unpersuasive.142 The court reasoned that Murphy
provided no basis for concluding that the parties intended to use the phrase “the law of
your state” to mean “federal law plus (nonfederal) state law,” and described that in
actuality, a reasonable reader would naturally interpret the provision to refer exclusively
to state law.143 Next, the court explained that Murphy also provided no basis to conclude
that “contract interpretation is irrelevant because the parties are powerless to opt out of
the FAA by contract,” and reiterated that choice-of-law would be enforceable where the
law of a state governs enforceability of an agreement.144 This interpretation, in the
court’s eyes, ultimately made the dispositive issue in the case whether the parties did, in
fact, choose to abide by state law, or in other words, if the parties actually decided to
submit to arbitration in the first place.145
V.  

THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

A.  The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether it was consistent with the
FAA for the California Court of Appeal to affirmatively answer the question of whether
“the law of your state” included invalid state law.146 In doing so, the Court looked to see
if this decision placed arbitration contracts “on equal footing with all other contracts” as
emphasized in Buckeye Check Cashing.147 Also, the Court looked to the grounds upon
which the California court offered to satisfy the savings clause and revoke the contract.148
The Court began by recognizing that, in principle, parties by way freedom of
contract can expressly render their arbitration agreements to the force of any type of law,
such as the “law of Tibet” or as set forth in Imburgia, the law of California that included
the Discover Bank rule regardless if it was invalidated in Concepcion.149 The Court
reasoned that because the California Court of Appeal relied on state contract law
principles to interpret the phrase “law of your state” as pertaining to invalid California
142
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law, or California law under the former Discover Bank rule, the Court needed to
determine if that use of California state contract law was consistent with the FAA.150
The Court found that the appellate court’s interpretation of the terms “law of your
state” was unique to the arbitration agreement and, therefore, did not place arbitration
agreements “on equal footing with other contracts.”151 Because the Court of Appeals’
approach to interpreting the provision within the arbitration agreement did not adhere to
the federal policy favoring arbitration, the FAA pre-empted the California court’s
interpretation and rendered the arbitration agreement enforceable.152
The Court employed six reasons to support its holding. First, the Court reasoned
that, contrary to the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning, the relevant contract
language of the “law of your state” was not ambiguous.153 The phrase “law of your state”
would ordinarily take the meaning valid state law, and not invalid state law, unless there
was an express indication to the contrary or the existence of supporting case law, which
there was not in this case.154 Second, the Court found that California case law provides
clarification when there is doubt about how to interpret contract language.155
Specifically, the law says that general contract principles in California incorporate the
legislature’s power to change the law retroactively and preserve that judicial construction
of statutes are ordinarily applied retroactively.156 Thus, the Court concluded that these
general contract principles would have defined how to more correctly interpret the “law
of your state” phrase for the appellate court.157
Third, the Court found there was no indication from argument or precedent that
California courts would ordinarily interpret the phrase “law of your state” to incorporate
invalid California law in a different contract context outside of arbitration.158 This
signaled to the Court that this was a tactic used by the appellate court so that it could
specifically invalidate the arbitration agreement.159 In other words, the appellate court’s
interpretation was not reflective of a general procedure all California courts use to
invalidate other contracts.160 Fourth, the Court based this conclusion on the fact that the
California Court of Appeal framed its question by focusing only on arbitration: whether
150

Id. at 468-69.

151

Id. at 471.

152

Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471.

153

Id. at 469.

154

Id. (emphasis added).

155

Id.

156

Id.

157

Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 469.

158

Id. (emphasis added).

159

Id. at 468-469.

160

Id. at 470.

170

“the law of your state” means “the law of your state to the extent that is it not preempted
by the FAA,” or “the law of your state without considering the preemptive effect, if any,
of the FAA.”161 The Court concluded that this phrasing indicated that the appellate
court’s holding was directed at the arbitration contract only and was not reflective of
contracts generally.162
Fifth, the Court reasoned that it was not likely that California courts would
support the view that state law retains independent force, even after it has been
authoritatively invalidated by the Supreme Court, and apply this view to general
contracts.163 In other words, the appellate court would be unlikely to hold that invalid
state law holds force as a matter of general contract principles, despite that it was so
quick to conclude that invalid state law superseded Concepcion.164 Lastly, the Court
focused on the appellate court’s reasoning that the “law of your state” constituted a
specific exception to the agreement’s general acknowledgment of the FAA, but the Court
explained that including the terms “specific exception” did not provide the express
support that the phrase “law of your state” encompassed invalid state law.165 Moreover,
the Court was not convinced that applying the canon construing contract language against
the drafter, DIRECTV, was a sufficient reason to assume the result the appellate court
reached.166 For all these reasons, the California Court of Appeal did not answer the
question of how to interpret the phrase “law of your state” in light of general contract
principles.167 Because the appellate court did not satisfy the savings clause of Section 2,
the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the FAA.168
B.  The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg argued in her dissent that the majority stepped beyond the
acceptable reaches of arbitration policy and consequently set forth a holding that unfairly
deprives consumers of reasonable protection.169 Focusing on the procedural history of
the case, Justice Ginsburg first maintained that the 2007 version of DIRECTV’s
agreement, which was at issue in Imburgia, blatantly allowed for the “law of
[California]” to govern the enforceability of the agreement’s class action prohibition.170
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This is because at the time the lawsuit commenced, the Discover Bank rule governed
California law, which rendered class action waivers per se unenforceable.171 Justice
Ginsburg emphasized that it was not until three years into the litigation and after
Concepcion was decided that DIRECTV moved to compel bilateral arbitration.172
Ultimately, the California Court of Appeal decided that the phrase “law of your state”
meant “the law of your state without considering any preemptive effect of the FAA”
because DIRECTV drafted the service agreement in a way to guarantee customers the
right to unilaterally modify the agreement at any time.173
The dissent’s reasoning portrayed that the parties could rightfully choose to be
bound by a particular law of California even if that law was rendered invalid after
Concepcion.174 This argument can be captured in the rhetorical question “Why are
parties allowed to be governed by the law of Tibet but not laws of the state purported to
remain valid at the time they are interpreted?”175 In addition, the majority was criticized
for its broad reliance on Concepcion, which the dissent explained “held only that a State
cannot compel a party to engage in class arbitration when the controlling agreement
unconditionally prohibits class procedures.”176 This meant that even after Concepcion,
the parties would still be able to bind themselves under the California CLRA law as not
pre-empted by the FAA, especially considering freedom of contract as emphasized in
Volt.177
Importantly, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decision is a
“dangerous first” because the Court has not once reversed a state court decision on the
grounds that the state court misapplied the state contract law when interpreting an
arbitration agreement.178 Justice Ginsburg further frowned upon the majority’s
unwillingness to embrace the application of a general canon used for contractual
interpretation of construing ambiguous language against the drafter.179 This would have
been a practical matter for the plaintiffs in 2007 who were unlikely to have predicted the
Supreme Court holding in Concepcion in 2011.180 Additionally, the dissent purported that
this decision runs beyond the scope of Concepcion and Italian Colors to the extent that it
“deprive[s] consumers of effective relief against powerful economic realities that write
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no-class-action arbitration clauses into their form contracts.”181 Thus, the consumers here
lacked the benefit of the doubt even when there were legitimate reasons to protect their
rights.182
Lastly, Justice Ginsburg reminisced that the Court’s current understanding of
FAA preemption no longer aligns with the main purposes with which Congress passed
the FAA, particularly for specific business parties and to curb judges’ reluctance to
enforce arbitration agreements.183 The dissent proposed that Congress in 1925 would
have never anticipated that in the future, the Court would apply the FAA with such a
preemptive force as to render consumers to adhesive contracts almost entirely
powerless.184 Ultimately, the dissent’s portrayal of the FAA indicates that the
federalization of the FAA has gone too far in its modern development.185
VI.  

CURRENT IMPLICATIONS FOR ARBITRATION

A.  Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent Warrants Additional Review of the History of
Arbitration

1.   Pinpointing the Original Purpose of the FAA
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent serves as a platform to re-analyze the history of
domestic arbitration law in light of the Act’s original purpose, as compared to how it was
previously portrayed for its growing federalized and pro-arbitration policy. In the days
before the Supreme Court recognized arbitration and its corresponding rights, American
businesses sought arbitration to resolve disputes privately and as an alternative to public
litigation.186 American courts neglected to enforce arbitration agreements and followed
the English “ouster doctrine,” as mentioned previously. The Supreme Court endorsed the
“ouster doctrine” in 1874 when it held “parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary
courts of their jurisdiction.”187 Precedents like this made American courts feel obliged to
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follow the English rule founded upon the jealously of judges who felt threatened by
arbitration in their own jurisdictions.188
Consequently, the business community urged Congress to enact the FAA because
of the advantages it could provide over traditional litigation.189 Overall, arbitration was
less expensive than litigation and was an expeditious method to resolve inter-merchant
disputes, particularly in the business context that dealt with perishable goods.190 In turn,
removing inter-merchant disputes from court dockets freed courts and reduced court
congestion.191
There are further historical reasons to believe that the origins of enforcing
arbitration agreements were pro-consumer, unlike what we see with adhesive arbitration
agreements today. First, the high costs of litigation between merchants were likely
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, so this made arbitration more
appealing to consumers.192 Second, the speed of arbitration likely reduced merchant
costs and prices because the FAA served to conserve perishable food products and save
capital in foodstuffs that would otherwise be wasted when dispositions from arbitration
agreements were not enforced.193 Third, the arbitral forum saved tax dollars for
consumers who ultimately paid less to maintain state courthouses flooded with intramerchant litigation.194
It follows that, because of these reasons, a wide range of merchant associations
endorsed the FAA, including, “fruit jobbers; wholesale grocers; raisin growers; poultry,
dairy, and egg producers; peach and fig growers; canners; music publishers; and coffee,
sugar, and lumber producers.”195 Merchants likewise supported the FAA because they
reasoned that an arbitrator familiar with their industry would best serve their interests.196
After many lobbying efforts, the FAA was enacted and construed to protect several of
these ideals.197
The original congressional intent underlying the FAA seems foreign when
compared to the Supreme Court’s modern expansion of the FAA. The text of the FAA
suggests that Congress only intended for arbitration to apply to a narrow set of legal
claims including inter-merchant contract disputes sounding in breach and maritime
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claims.198 In light of the current body of arbitration law, little evidence supports that
arbitration was intended for statutory problems, like antitrust, or complex legal issues
stemming from statutory claims.199 Moreover, the aforementioned reasons underlying
merchant disputes support that arbitration was especially more likely to cover “routine
commercial matters of contract interpretation, breach and remedy” rather than consumer
contracts of adhesion.200
Nonetheless, several examples portray how the Supreme Court has extended the
FAA despite the absence of support provided in the text or the legislative history. For
example, in Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court emphasized that the FAA reflects, “a
congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”201 but
considering the reasons upon which merchants lobbied for enactment of the FAA, the
Court’s position is puzzling and evidenced by little support.202
Also, the Supreme Court has supported the enforcement of adhesive arbitration
agreements at all costs despite any indication from the original drafting that the FAA was
meant to expand the way it did.203 Congress’s intent likely did not match the Supreme
Court’s interpretation, though, because of the obvious differences that currently divide
consumer and merchant contracts. For example, parties to business contracts “have a
similar incentive to structure a neutral arbitration process.”204 This is because “each party
bears a similar risk of being the plaintiff or defendant.”205 On the contrary, in a consumer
contract, it is more likely that a powerful business entity would maintain a strong
incentive to impose an anti-plaintiff arbitration process on a consumer.206
It follows that Congress affirmatively could not have envisioned the implications
that are reflective of adhesive, consumer arbitration agreements. Modern consumer
contracts are not formed from negotiations between parties with equal bargaining power,
and this often renders the consumer powerless in the contract formation process and
likewise in arbitration proceedings.207 Right now, consumers bound by these agreements
lack so much power that they are unaware that their contracts include mandatory
arbitration proceedings, or that by signing the arbitration agreement, they expressly waive
their right to engage in class action arbitration against the business entity.208 Ultimately,
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when considering the original purpose of the FAA and the ever-broadening scope of
arbitration’s impact, it is unlikely that Congress envisioned such a “liberal policy” when
it drafted the FAA.
2.   Further Review of the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Precedent
In addition to focusing on the original congressional intent of the FAA, further
review of the Supreme Court’s decisions suggests that the Supreme Court has become
somewhat lost in its own jurisprudence. As Justice O’Connor famously put it in AlliedBruce Terminix, “the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional
intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an
edifice of its own creation.”209 This proposition has merit while further reconsidering the
history of the Court construing the FAA to achieve a much liberalized policy.
It should first be remembered that even after the FAA was passed, judges still
displayed hostility and resistance to arbitration. This is most evidenced in Wilko v. Swan,
which held that claims stemming from the Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to
arbitration.210 This decision was puzzling, and likely the result of lingering hostility,
because the arbitration clause at issue was relatively clear, there was knowing and
voluntary consent of the parties, and standard practices of the industry and expectations
of the parties were evident.211 Similarly in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, the
Court held that the arbitration act was procedural rather than substantive and subject to
the Erie doctrine, which had the effect of rendering Vermont law applicable to the
case.212
Following in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court began to warm up to arbitration
despite its earlier doubts. In 1967, the Court decided Prima Paint, and, as discussed
previously, appeared to display a more favorable attitude toward arbitration by deciding
that the issue of fraudulent inducement as to entering a contract containing an arbitration
clause was reserved for the arbitrator.213 Likewise, the Court began to show greater
affection for arbitration in the context of labor arbitration with the Steelworkers Trilogy,
where the Court emphasized that arbitration was a critical component of the collective
bargaining process in both United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co. and
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.214 However, in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., the Court in the mid-1970s evidenced concern for establishing that
arbitration clauses had a broad scope when it held that a Title VII claim of a union
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employee was not subject to the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement
to which he was subject.215
The 1980s cases promoting arbitration comprised the turn toward the modern era
of arbitration. The Court used pro-arbitration rhetoric in Moses H. Cone when it moved
quickly to compel arbitration and reject the application of Colorado River abstention.216
The Court relied on the notion that the FAA “creates . . . a substantive law of arbitrability
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”217 While the
FAA appeared to apply in state courts as well as federal courts, this issue was not
resolved until Southland Corp.218 In Moses H. Cone, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O’Connor displayed their reservations about the Court’s zealous proarbitration ruling, fearing that the majority decided too quickly on an order that permitted
appeal.219
Nonetheless, the Court subsequently held in Southland Corp. that the FAA serves
as substantive law based on the “strong indications that Congress had in mind something
more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in federal courts” as well as
the congressional intent to create a body of substantive law applicable in state courts as to
ultimately prevent state legislatures from “undercut[ting] the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.”220 The dissent, however, cautioned that Congress had only intended the
FAA to apply to federal court proceedings and strongly argued that the Southland Corp.
majority may have embraced the personal preference for expanding arbitration rather
than carefully considering precedent, such as Bernhardt, which viewed the FAA as
merely procedural.221 The Court in Southland Corp. dodged Bernhardt completely, and
the application of the FAA appeared not only inconsistent with federalism and states’
rights, but also with what Congress evidenced as its intent.222 Thus, Southland Corp. is
powerful because it “appears to mark the beginning of an ideological shift in that
Republican and conservative Justices, who might otherwise have opposed broad
arbitration clause enforcement on federalism and states’ rights grounds, became
arbitration advocates . . . .”223 In close cases today, there are no Republican-appointed
Justices who oppose arbitration.224
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Following Southland Corp., the Court continued to show its developing proarbitration attitude in Byrd, in which the Court compelled the arbitration of state law
claims and rejected that the claims were subject to litigation because they were
intertwined with other securities claims.225 The Court took a larger step in Mitsubishi
when it reiterated the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and required the
arbitration of antitrust claims.226 Yet, the Court seemingly failed to find any basis in the
statutory text, legislative intent or purpose, or public policy to support its holding.227 The
majority explained, “[w]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying every
contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.”228 Two
terms later, Justice O’Connor, who dissented in Southland Corp., led the majority opinion
in McMahon, which was another important pro-arbitration opinion in regards to the
arbitrability of statutory claims.229 This further evidenced the Court’s “emerging
enthusiasm” for arbitration.230 In turn, Perry was decided in the same year as McMahon
and rested on the criticisms of Southland Corp. that the Court’s enthusiasm for arbitration
has sidestepped the protection of the states and the actual intent and goals of Congress.231
Since the turn of the century, the Supreme Court has continued to display a
zealous attitude toward enforcing arbitration agreements, but with some caveats. For
example, Buckeye Check Cashing and Preston are currently viewed as strong precedents
upholding the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration which demands utmost
deference to arbitrators and the FAA’s preemption effect over state law.232 Although
Hall Street Associates does not clearly indicate the Court’s preference for arbitration, the
decision arguably can be considered pro-arbitration by the Court’s refusal to expand the
grounds of judicial review under Section 10 of the FAA.233
There is no doubt, however, that Stolt-Nielsen represents a disruption in the
Court’s consistent renderings of decisions promoting the emphatic federal policy of the
FAA.234 In Stolt-Nielsen, an animal-feed supplier sought to compel class action
proceedings under a broadly worded arbitration clause that undisputedly bound the
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animal-feed supplier and its opponent-shipper to arbitration proceedings.235 The
arbitrators decided that the clause allowed for class action arbitration and stayed the
proceedings pending the court’s review.236 The Supreme Court surprisingly reversed the
decision and accused the arbitrators of exceeding their powers by imposing their own
policy on the matter, instead of treating the matter as one of contract.237
Stolt-Nielsen should be discussed for some of its underlying ironies. For example,
the parties in Stolt-Nielsen are reflective of the types of business parties the FAA was
originally intended to serve as two “substantial commercial entities of sufficient
bargaining power to look after their own interests.”238 Moreover, it is ironic that the
Court was suddenly concerned with whether or not there was sufficient consent to
arbitrate when the Court had not considered the issue seriously in any of the decisions
following Southland Corp.239 Thus, it appears that the Court was suddenly concerned
with this issue when defendants, who were resisting arbitration, had slightly more
commercial power and would be disempowered by the class action relief requested.240
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Stolt-Nielsen foreshadows her dissent in Imburgia
because she suggested that the Court went too far in that it prematurely interfered in
Stolt-Nielsen.241 The dissent criticized the Stolt-Nielsen arbitration panel for deciding
based on policy, but indicated that the issue ultimately was “not ripe for judicial
review.”242 It followed that the Court should have deferred to the strict limitations the
FAA places on judicial review of arbitral awards.243 As Justice Ginsburg accurately
pointed out, “[t]he question properly before the Court [was] not whether the arbitrators’
ruling was erroneous but whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers.’ The arbitrators
decided a threshold issue, explicitly committed to them, about a procedural mode . . . .”244
Thus, Justice Ginsburg not only pointed out the Court’s inconsistency with its previous
arbitration decisions, but further alluded to the Court’s fearless stake in shaping
arbitration jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, the Court reinstated its pro-arbitration platform when it decided
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson less than two months after Stolt-Nielsen.245 Relying on Prima
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Paint and Buckeye, the Court deferred a question about unconscionability to the arbitrator
and precluded any judicial assessment of the broadly worded agreement despite the
savings clause of Section 2.246 There is no doubt that in recent times, Concepcion should
be coined the Court’s truest masterpiece in arbitration jurisprudence for its resilient
position to enforce arbitration agreements at the expense of class action lawsuits.
However, the implications of the Court’s achievement in reaching an undeniably proarbitration jurisprudence can unfortunately now be viewed as less than satisfying for the
specific reasons outlined below.
B.  Understanding the Modern Scope of Domestic Arbitration Law

1.   Defining Arbitration under the Roberts Court
The Roberts Court has been accused of displaying a “tainted love”247 toward the
enforcement of arbitration agreements and, to an extreme extent, “represent[s] a new low
point in the Court’s FAA jurisprudence” in terms of defining arbitration’s scope.248 In
sum, various Roberts Court decisions can be construed as generally reflective of negative
implications. Three specific areas outline these implications for adhesive agreements in
particular, which include (1) claim suppressing arbitration, (2) boot strapping arbitration,
and (3) the critiques of the majority’s holding in Concepcion.
a.   Claim Suppressing Arbitration
Claim suppressing arbitration is a term that can accurately describe modern
adhesive arbitration. It underlines the motivation of employers who seek to include predispute arbitration within agreements in order to control and suppress future claims of
their employees.249 For example, employers are motivated to keep “highs-cost/highstakes” claims out of court because these claims are presented in complex disputes where
the liability payoff for the plaintiff is potentially high, and this justifies the plaintiff’s cost
and risk in pursuing the claim.250 In contrast, employers seek to litigate “low-cost/highstakes” claims with the hope that litigation will drive up the plaintiff’s costs to the extent
that pursuing the judgment is no longer justified.251 Perhaps the most obvious example of
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class suppressing arbitration stems from the Court’s decision in Concepcion.252 Nothing
appears to be more class-suppressing than banning class action waivers for individuals
who would never realistically litigate their claims alone; the liability would far exceed the
costs of litigating.253
Claim suppressing arbitration has been an implication of the Court’s deference to
the strong emphatic federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
This proposition is first supported by the fact that strong evidence suggests that the FAA
was not designed to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements in one-sided, adhesive
contracts.254 The Court has repeatedly held that adhesive contracts are enforceable under
the FAA, despite the fact that the original intent of the FAA purports to serve business
parties of equal bargaining power with similar risks in the dispute.255 In addition, the
Court eliminated the chance to observe any public policy type exceptions to the FAA
when it overruled Wilko.256 Having this exception would have made it easy for the Court
to address the issue of claim suppression throughout the history of federalizing the
FAA.257
This implication also adversely affects due process rights when agreements are
rigorously enforced under the current policy of arbitration.258 First, due process is
arguably affected when the “neutral arbitrator,” most likely hired by the employer, has a
financial stake in the outcome of the decision.259 Simply put, an arbitrator is more likely
to enforce an arbitration agreement because he will be paid more for seeing the dispute to
its end than for rendering the arbitration agreement unenforceable.260 Second, it is
arguably unfair to allow the wealthier and more powerful party (the employer) to
completely control how the dispute will be resolved. Therefore, the expansive scope of
the FAA has not merely created an alternative dispute resolution process, but rather a
deceptive tactic widely incorporated into modern business practice.
b.   Boot Strapping Arbitration
Similar to claim suppressing arbitration is the notion of boot strapping arbitration,
which underlines further negative implications that derive from the current body of law.
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Boot strapping arbitration refers to situations where parties of superior bargaining power
insert unconscionable terms into arbitration agreements with the hope that a judge would
be more likely to enforce them because of current policy underlying the emphatic
enforcement of arbitration agreements.261 Boot strapping arbitration is recognized largely
in the form of adhesive agreements and demonstrates inherent unfairness that exists to
undercut consumers and employees.262 Similar to claim suppressing arbitration, boot
strapping arbitration was arguably promoted after the Court decided Concepcion
considering that class action waivers are now written as boilerplate language in many
contracts.263
The current arbitration regime has allowed employers to get away with adding
several other types of unconscionable provisions into adhesive contracts in addition to
class action waivers. Six examples include: (1) unconscionably short statute of
limitations periods, (2) limits on damages, (3) anti-injunctive clauses, (4) fee shifting
provisions, (5) forum-selection clauses, and (6) non-coordination clauses.264 In sum,
businesses have used arbitration clauses to trick parties into agreeing to unreasonably
short statute of limitations periods and also to unknowingly waive their rights to punitive
damages and injunctive relief.265 Businesses have also attempted to contract around proplaintiff fee shifting provisions and have included forum-selection clauses in their
arbitration agreements to pre-designate a court in the case of litigation.266 Lastly,
businesses have employed confidentiality requirements to prevent plaintiffs from sharing
information or costs among other plaintiffs seeking injuries through non-coordination
clauses.267 These tactics are arguably a result of the Court’s tainted deference to
enforcing arbitration agreements, which in many ways sits blindly to some of the most
basic consumer and employee rights.
c.   Critiques of Concepcion
Concepcion has been widely criticized as a further source of negative implications
that have unfairly fallen upon consumers and employees subject to adhesive
agreements.268 Concepcion, as previously mentioned, invalidated California’s Discover
Bank rule when it held that class action waivers were neither unconscionable nor an
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acceptable grounds to invalidate an entire arbitration agreement.269 Professor George
Bermann argued that the Concepcion holding is fundamentally flawed and inconsistent
with the Court’s established decisions underlying U.S. arbitration.270 First, he curiously
explained that if Stolt-Nielsen served its intended purpose, then the Concepcion decision
was unnecessary given that Stolt-Nielsen evidenced that only express language in the
agreement would subject parties to class arbitration.271 Importantly, Bermann emphasized
that Concepcion invades parties’ basic fairness in arbitration agreements.272 Referring to
Justice Scalia’s suggestion in the majority that the states cannot dictate whether parties
subject themselves to full scale discovery or jury trials against their wishes, he made a
valid observation:
[T]he fact that the FAA does not allow states to impose pretrial
discovery and jury trials in arbitration does not mean that states
cannot override party agreements that would jeopardize
arbitration’s basic fairness.273
Concepcion blocked California and other state courts from guaranteeing this basic
fairness to parties of arbitration agreements.274 Bermann suggested that the California
Discover Bank rule merely promised to enforce class-wide arbitration if the parties had
agreed to it.275 In other words, Bermann presented an alternative reading of Concepcion
and suggested that perhaps the Court moved too quickly in Concepcion to write off
Discover Bank, which could be alternatively viewed as valid state law.276 Consequently,
this understanding of Concepcion sheds a negative light on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation and holding.
Further questions and observations highlight that perhaps the Supreme Court, in
rendering Concepcion, was more excited about expanding the federal policy rather than
cautiously considering parties’ rights to arbitration agreements. For example, why did
the Supreme Court declare class action waivers per se unenforceable in Concepcion
instead of allowing courts to analyze class action waivers under the particular facts on a
case-by-case basis?277 Professor Jeffrey Stempel has asked, “[w]here does the majority
get its . . . idea—that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental attribute’
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of arbitration?”278 Consistent with claim suppressing arbitration, it follows that no
rational person would fight for the $30.22 which the individual plaintiffs in Concepcion
would have likely received.279 Lastly, Concepcion, in some ways, is a “blueprint for
bootstrapping” because the holding risks “the ability of courts to hold other
unconscionable contract terms unenforceable” by “holding that judges cannot use the
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate a term embedded in an arbitration agreement.”280
In sum, Concepcion is undoubtedly the high pedestal upon which the Roberts
Court reemphasized the emphatic federal policy underlying arbitration. However,
alternative interpretations of its holding support the concept that the disposition has set a
stage upon which powerful parties are further able to implement arbitration agreements
fully to their advantage.281 These implications likewise will follow from Imburgia, in
which the Court disregarded the use of what the California court regarded as applicable
state law to interpret the contract.282 Arguably, Imburgia goes beyond Concepcion
because it not only limited the consumers rights to the arbitration agreement, but also
infringed upon the general protection that states are left alone to interpret contracts under
their own state law.283 Altogether, Concepcion and Imburgia further legitimize deceitful
business practices such as claim suppressing and boot strapping arbitration, and this is
because of the adamant federal policy upon which the Roberts Court not only relies, but
more expansively promotes.
VII.   CONCLUSION
Many aspects of this article have indicated that U.S. arbitration law is currently
defined by an expanded scope, which underscores several negative implications. The
emphatic federal policy underlying arbitration has been further promoted by the Roberts
Court through the new disposition in Imburgia. By holding that consumers to the
DIRECTV contract were subject to the preemption effect of the FAA, the Court
effectively precluded the states from applying another method purported to protect
consumers from the negative consequences of adhesive contracts.284 This disposition
prompted Justice Ginsburg to deem the decision “dangerous.”285 After reviewing the
Court’s history of ignoring what reasonably appears to be the original congressional
intent of the FAA, further precedent that seemingly appears to stand on questionable
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grounds, and the modern use of adhesive contracts, there are reasons to conclude that
Justice Ginsburg correctly described the current state of domestic arbitration.
Another conclusion, although frustrating, is that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact
reason why the Supreme Court has insisted on creating the emphatic federal policy
underlying the enforcement of arbitration agreements. While this article has explored
many areas including the history of federalization—from Congress’ narrowed intent to
pass the FAA for merchant disputes to the Court’s response to California’s continued
resistance to the FAA or perhaps the Court’s mere infatuation with arbitration by itself—
the answer still remains unclear in light of Imburgia. Nonetheless, the many implications
discussed in this article affirmatively support the conclusion that Imburgia provides the
necessary platform upon which one can re-examine and define the current scope of
arbitration.
All things considered, so long as precedent such as Imburgia will define the
current scope of arbitration jurisprudence, alternative legislation might be the only option
to prevent the aforementioned dangerous implications of arbitration. Until that day
comes, Imburgia stands tall as the legitimate defender of Court’s emphatic federal policy,
and regardless of potentially negative implications, its far-reaching consequences and
definitive scope will continue to affect many under its expansive regime.
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